In a Walrasian equilibrium (WE), all bidders are envy-free (EF), meaning that their allocation maximizes their utility; and the market clears (MC), meaning that the price of unallocated goods is zero. EF is desirable to ensure the long-term viability of the market. MC ensures that demand meets supply.
INTRODUCTION
In a centralized combinatorial matching market (CCMM) [Cramton et al., 2006, De Vries and Vohra, 2003 ], a market maker o ers a set U of n heterogeneous goods to m consumers (or bidders), the la er of which are interested in acquiring combinations (or bundles) of goods. In general, there are multiple copies of each good i, but the total supply of each good is nite. Bidder j's preferences are captured by a valuation function that describes how j values each bundle. In general, a bidder's valuation function can be an arbitrary function of the set of all bundles. CCMMs are a fundamental market model with many practical applications a few of which are: estate auctions, transportation networks, wireless spectrum allocation and electronic advertising markets; and thus, these markets have been extensively studied in the literature [Anshelevich et al., 2015 , Babaio et al., 2009 , Guruswami et al., 2005 , Monaco et al., 2015 , Nisan et al., 2007 .
Given a CCMM, a market outcome is an allocation-pricing pair (X , p), where X describes an allocation of goods to bidders, and p ascribes prices to goods. While X is a matrix, in our model we assume that p is a vector, which precludes any form of price discrimination (all copies of the same good must have the same price). Furthermore, we assume item pricing, not bundle pricing, so that the price of a bundle is the sum of the prices of all the goods (items) in the bundle. Both of these assumptions-no price discrimination and item pricing-are most natural. Given a market outcome, we assume quasi-linear utilitites, meaning bidder j's utility is de ned to be the di erence between their valuation for the bundle they are allocated, and its price.
In a CCMM, of paramount concern is what properties are desirable in an outcome. In this paper, we focus on a fundamental market outcome known as Walrasian equilibrium (WE) [Walras, 2003 ]. An outcome is said to be a WE if two properties hold: (1) all bidders are envy-free (EF), meaning the outcome is utility-maximizing for all, and (2) the market clears (MC), meaning the price of any unallocated good is zero. A WE is a fundamental market outcome that ensures that market participants are maximally happy with the outcome while at the same time supply meets demand. Moreover, by the rst welfare theorem of economics, any allocation that is part of a WE is also maximizes (social) welfare (i.e., the total utility of the bidders and the market maker).
While of great theoretical importance, the WE concept su ers from two important drawbacks. First, a WE might not exist, even for relatively simple forms of bidders' valuation functions (see Section 2, for an example). Second, even when one does exist, the revenue of a WE outcome can be low, in particular as low as zero. Revenue in this context is de ned as the total income of the market maker, i.e. i, j x i j p i .
A well-known approach to simultaneously address both existence and low revenue is to relax only the MC condition, and instead require that the price of unallocated goods is some, possibly non-zero, reserve price. is approach is known as Envy-Free Pricing (EFP) [Brânzei et al., 2016 , Feldman et al., 2012 , Guruswami et al., 2005 and has been extensively studied in the case of single-minded bidders (see, for example [Cheung and Swamy, 2008, Guruswami et al., 2005] ). is is not the only approach to relaxing a WE that has been proposed. For example, to address the existence issue, Postlewaite and Schmeidler [Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 1981] de ne an ϵ-WE in which every bidder is envy-free up to a ratio of 1-ϵ, and Huang, Li, and Zhang [Huang et al., 2005] try to maximize the ratio of envy-free bidders to all bidders. Note that in all of these approaches, one only relaxes either the EF or the MC condition.
In this paper, we go one step further and relax both the EF and MC conditions. We propose a relaxation of the EF condition where only winners (bidders that are part of the allocation) are EF, and further relax the MC condition such that unallocated goods are priced at least at the reserve. We call this new solution concept Restricted Envy-Free Pricing (REFP). We investigate what REFP entails for single-minded bidders, and show that for size-interchangeable bidders (a generalization of the single-minded case we introduce in this paper) we can compute REFP in polynomial time, given a xed allocation. In the case of single-minded bidders, there exist polynomial-time algorithms to nd nearly welfare-maximizing allocations [Lehmann et al., 2002] . We extend these algorithms to size-interchangeable, and use them to compute REFP outcomes.
As in the case of EFP, we remain interested in computing outcomes with maximal revenue. Drawing inspiration from algorithms proposed for EFP in the case of unit-demand and singleminded bidders, we propose and evaluate algorithms to nd revenue-maximizing REFP in the case of size-interchangeable bidders. ese algorithms work by exploring a space of reserve prices: for each candidate reserve price, they nd an EFP, and then, among all outcomes seen, they choose one with maximal revenue.
Alternatively, given a candidate reserve price, one could have instead solved for an allocation that respects the reserve price and then solved for a corresponding set of supporting prices, each one being at least the reserve.
is two-step process ( rst solve for an allocation and then for prices) fails in the case of EFP since, given an allocation, envy-free prices might not exist. However, restricted envy-free prices always exist. is begs the question: given an allocation, are these prices e ciently computable?
In this paper, we answer this question in the a rmative for two special cases: single-minded bidders and size-interchangeable bidders. In the case of single-minded bidders, we show that nding a set of revenue-maximizing REFP reduces to the problem of nding a welfare-maximizing allocation. In the more complicated case of size-interchangeable bidders, we derive necessary and su cient conditions for nding restricted envy-free prices, given a xed allocation, and propose a greedy heuristic to nd approximately welfare-maximizing allocations. Our characterization of restricted envy-free prices is a linear characterization and thus, together with our greedy heuristic, we succeed in nding REFP for size-interchangeable bidders in polynomial-time.
Our linear characterization is agnostic as to the objective function being optimized. us, we present a powerful two-step framework where we rst solve for an allocation, and then for restricted envy-free prices for any linear objective function of the prices. We then apply this methodology to solve, in particular, for revenue-maximizing REFP for a xed allocation and reserve price, and use this algorithm at the heart of a heuristic to nd revenue maximizing REFP among all allocations and reserve prices. We evaluate the performance of our revenue-maximizing heuristic by running extensive experiments, using both synthetic and real-world data and by feeding it allocations obtained with two di erent objectives: (1) egalitarian, which maximizes the number of winners, and (2) welfare-maximizing, which maximizes total utility.
Our size-interchangeable model is motivated by the Trading Agent Competition Ad Exchange game (TAC AdX) [Schain and Mansour, 2013] , which in turn models online ad exchanges in which agents face the challenge of bidding for display-ad impressions needed to ful ll advertisement contracts, a er which they earn the amount the advertiser budgeted. Other se ings captured by this model include the problem of how to allocate specialized workers to rms, and how to compensate the workers, where each rm requires a certain number of workers to produce an output (a new technology, for instance) that yields a certain revenue. e paper is organized as follow: Section 2 presents some preliminaries and our formal model, with examples. Section 3 presents methods for computing REFP in the case of single-minded and sizeinterchangeable bidders. Section 4 builds on the methods of Section 3 to derive a polynomial-time heuristic to nd revenue-maximizing REFP outcomes. Section 5 presents results in the of singleton and single-minded CCMMs. Section 6 presents experiments where we evaluate the performance of our algorithms. Finally, we conclude and discuss possible future research directions.
MODEL AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS
We de ne a centralized combinatorial matching market (CCMM) (or market, for short) as an augmented bipartite graph M = (U , C, E, N , I , R), with a set of n types of goods U , a set of m bidders C, a set of edges E from goods to bidders indicating which goods are of interest to which bidders, a supply vector N = (N 1 , . . . , N n ), a demand vector I = (I 1 , . . . , I m ), and a reward vector R = (R 1 , . . . , R m ). at is, there are N i > 0 copies of good i ∈ U , and I j > 0 total goods are demanded by bidder j ∈ C, where this total is a sum across all types of goods i ∈ U such that (i, j) ∈ E. Reward R j > 0 is a ained by j in case its demand I j is ful lled. We call bidders whose valuations are characterized by acquiring bundles of goods of at least some xed size size-interchangeable (SI).
Given a market M, an allocation is a labeling x (i, j) ∈ Z ≥0 of E that represents the number of copies of good i allocated to bidder j. Such an allocation can be represented by a matrix
, where entry x i j = x (i, j). e jth column of an allocation matrix is the bundle of goods assigned to bidder j, which we denote by X j ∈ B( N ), where B( N ) = i {0, 1, . . . , N i }.
Having de ned a market and an allocation, we now formally de ne SI valuations.
De nition 2.1. (Size-interchangeable valuations). Given a market (U , C, E, N , I , R), and an allocation X , a bidder j's valuation is size-interchangeable, if it demands I j > 0 total goods among those types to which it is connected, and values all such bundles by the function: V j (X j ) = R j , if i |(i, j ) ∈E x i j ≥ I j , and 0 otherwise. Our model (speci cally, these valuations), are motivated by Ad Exchanges-in particular, the Ad Exchange Game [Schain and Mansour, 2013] -in which agents bid to ful ll advertisers' campaigns c, each of which requires a xed number of impressions I j from targeted web users u to obtain a reward R j . Note also that SI valuations generalize single-minded bidders [Nisan et al., 2007] , in which bidders are interested only in one particular bundle of goods. goods bidders
Outcome (B) allocates 2 copies of good G to bidder Y at a price of $5 per copy, and 2 copies of good F to bidder Z at a price of $1 per copy. is outcome results in the optimal social welfare of $15 and a revenue of $12. Outcome (C) allocates to bidder Z only, 1 copy of good G at a price of $1, and 1 copy of good F at a price of $2. is outcome results in a social welfare of $5 and a revenue of $3.
A market outcome is an allocation-pricing pair (X , p), assigning goods to bidders and pergood prices p i ∈ R + . Given such an outcome, the cost of bundle X j to bidder j is given by
An allocation is feasible if the total number of goods assigned across bidders is no more than supply: i.e., for all i ∈ U : m j=1 x i j ≤ N i . We write F ≡ F (M ) to denote the set of all feasible allocations. In a feasible outcome the allocation is feasible.
We refer to a bidder whose demand is ful lled under allocation X as a winner, and denote by W the set of all winners. e welfare of a feasible outcome is equal to the sum of the utilities of all bidders and the market maker, which reduces to the sum of the rewards of all winners, i.e. j ∈W R j . A fundamental market outcome studied in the literature is that of Walrasian Equilibrium (WE) [Walras, 2003 ], which we de ne using our notation as follows.
De nition 2.3. A feasible outcome (X , p) is a Walrasian Equilibrium (WE) if the following two conditions hold:
(1) Envy-freeness (EF): ere is no bundle X j that any bidder j prefers to its assigned bundle X j , i.e., for all j, X j ∈ arg max
(2) Market clearance (MC): Every unallocated good is priced at zero, i.e.,
e EF condition is a fairness condition; it ensures that the outcome maximizes the utility of every bidder. Note that each bidder is individually rational i.e., u j (X , p) ≥ 0, since the null allocation is always a feasible allocation. e MC condition, together with EF, implies, by the rst welfare theorem of economics, that any allocation that is part of a WE is also welfare-maximizing. However, a WE need not exist in the markets studied in this paper.
Example 2.4. (Non-existence of WE) Consider the market in Figure ( A) with one good and two single-minded bidders. Good u 1 is supplied in N 1 = 2 copies, bidder c 1 demands I 1 = 1 good, and bidder c 2 demands I 2 = 2 goods. Rewards are R 1 = 5 and R 2 = 7. (B) Not Envy-Free (C) Market doesn't clear ere are a total of 6 feasible allocations in this market and none of them are part of a Walrasian Equilibrium. Two such allocations are depicted in (B) and (C). In (B), there is no price p 1 for u 1 at which both bidders would be envy-free. In (C), we must have that p 1 ≥ 3.5, or otherwise c 2 would have preferred 2 copies from u 1 . But then the market does not clear since there is an unsold copy of u 1 with price greater than 0.
To combat this di culty, researchers have proposed various ways of relaxing the WE conditions to arrive at solution concepts with guaranteed existence. One such proposal is Envy-Free Pricing, which we de ne in our language as follows.
De nition 2.5. A feasible outcome (X , p) is an Envy-Free Pricing (EFP) if EF holds. Unlike a WE, an EFP always exists. An outcome in which no goods are allocated, and all are priced at in nity is a trivial, albeit undesirable, example of an EFP.
An EFP relaxes only the MC condition. We go one step further and relax both EF and MC conditions to de ne our new solution concept, Restricted-Envy-Free Pricing.
De nition 2.6. A feasible outcome (X , p) is an Restricted-Envy-Free Pricing (REFP) if only winners are envy-free.
Similar to an EFP, this solution concept always exists (same trivial example as before). However, whereas for a xed allocation, an EFP might not exist, a REFP always exists, even if an allocation has been decided upon beforehand. us, our solution concept provides a stronger guarantee of existence and paves the way for fast computational methods to nd such outcomes.
POLYNOMIAL-TIME COMPUTATION OF REFP
In this section, we show how to e ciently compute REFP in size-interchangeable CCMMs. Ours is a two-step approach where we rst solve for an allocation; then, xing the allocation, we solve for a set of supporting prices. We show that both of these steps can be done in polynomial time, and thus, we derive a polynomial-time algorithm to nd REFP outcomes.
Finding Allocations
Although a REFP is not a WE, and hence the rst welfare theorem does not imply welfare maximization, approximate welfare maximization itself, to the extent it is achievable, remains desirable.
ALGORITHM 1: Greedy approximation algorithm to nd allocations. Input: Market M Output: Allocation X For all i, j set x i j = 0 // Start with the null allocation foreach j ∈ C do Let U j = {i | (i, j) ∈ E and m j=1 x i j < N i } // Goods demanded by j still in supply if i ∈U j N i ≥ I j // Check that there are enough goods left for j to be satisfied
Allocate copies of i to j until j's demand // is 0 or i's supply is 0. Continue until demand is 0.
Furthermore, revenue-maximizing REFP outcomes, the subject of Section 4, will rely on allocations that extract substantial value from bidders.
De nition 3.1. (Utilitarian) A utilitarian, or welfare-maximizing, allocation in a CCMM is a solution to the following optimization problem:
Since size-interchangeable bidders generalize single-minded, nding a welfare-maximizing allocation is NP-hard [Lehmann et al., 2002] . Consequently, it is unlikely that one can devise a polynomial-time algorithm that maximizes welfare in size-interchangeable CCMMs.
We generalize Lehmann et. al's greedy allocation scheme for single-minded bidders to sizeinterchangeable bidders in Algorithm 1. ere are two sources of non-determinism in Algorithm 1: (1) the order in which to loop through bidders and (2) the order in which to loop through goods.
e following theorem shows that ordering bidders in descending order of rewards per square root of goods demanded, i.e., R j / I j , produces approximately optimal allocations, regardless of the order in which goods are allocated. e approximation is linear in the number of bidders. T 3.2. e value of an allocation produced by the greedy approximation algorithm where bids are ordered in ascending order of R j / I j is within m √ I * of the value of a welfare-maximizing allocation, where m is the number of bidders and I * = max j ∈C I j .
P
. (Sketch) e proof follows the logic Lehmann et. al. eir key idea is to bound the number of bidders that can be blocked by the greedy algorithm. A bidder j blocks a bidder k if by allocating to j rst we cannot later allocate to k.
eir idea extends to SI valuations by noting that in the worst-case, a bidder j might block all bidders, and all blocked bidders might demand I * goods, so we obtain a weaker bound for the more general case of size-interchangeable bidders.
In the case where I * = 1, this bound is tight. Consider a market with two bidders c 1 , c 2 , and two types of goods u 1 , u 2 , such that: R 1 = R 2 = 2; I 1 = I 2 = 1, and N 1 = N 2 = 1. Bidder c 1 demands goods of type u 1 and u 2 , while bidder 2 only demands goods of type u 2 . e optimal allocation allocates 2 goods to each bidder, and yields welfare of 4. Algorithm 1 is indi erent between allocating to c 1 or c 2 rst. Say c 1 is allocated rst. If the goods allocated are of type u 2 , then bidder c 2 cannot be allocated, resulting in an allocation with welfare of only 2. In this case, the bound is tight since 2m √ I * = 4. It remains to investigate whether this bound is tight for values I * > 1. Note that the trivial algorithm that allocates all the goods to the bidder with the largest reward achieves a be er approximation guarantee of m. We remain interested in other algorithms that allocate to multiple bidders and thus, present eorem 3.2 as a rst step towards nding a tighter bound in the future. We also present this theorem to illustrate the connection between the problem studied in this paper and that of Lehmann et. al. [Lehmann et al., 2002] De nition 3.3. (Egalitarian) An egalitarian allocation in a CCMM is a solution to the following optimization problem: max X m j=1 j , s.t.: ∀i :
3.4. Algorithm 1 can also be used to obtain an allocation that is within m √ I * of the optimal egalitarian allocation simply by ordering bidders by 1/ I j .
Finding Restricted Envy-Free Prices, Given an Allocation
Given an allocation, we now turn to the question of nding restricted envy-free prices for said allocation. Before presenting our algorithm, we formally de ne restricted envy-free prices. Let
x i j be the size of bidder j's bundle, and let B(
to be the set of all feasible bundles of size |X j |.
De nition 3.5. (Restricted Envy-Free) A pricing p is called restricted envy-free with respect to a feasible allocation X if, for all j such that |X j | > 0,
is de nition is "restricted" because it assumes an allocation, and then is only concerned with the envy-freeness of winners in that allocation: i.e., bidders that are allocated. Any envy felt by any other bidders is simply ignored.
Another seeming restriction is that even for a bidder j with |X j | > 0, it does not require envyfreeness with respect to all bundles X j ∈ B( N ), but only with respect to bundles of the same size as X j (i.e., X j ∈ B( N |X j | )), and the empty bundle 0. As we are focused on bidders with single-valued, size-interchangeable valuations, we are likewise concerned with all-or-none allocations, which either allocate to a bidder in full, meaning a bundle of size I j , or do not allocate at all. Hence, for our purposes the size restriction is not restrictive at all. T 3.6. Given a market M and a feasible allocation X , the following conditions are necessary and su cient for p to be restricted envy-free.
. (Sketch) e Individual Rationality condition ensures that winners do not pay more than their reward. e Compact Condition states that good types that are allocated in their entirety to a single bidder can be priced more cheaply than those that are only partially allocated, but all partially-allocated goods must be priced equally. It follows that the bundle assigned to a winner is the cheapest among all available bundles.
A detailed proof of this theorem is provided in the appendix. 
Algorithm to nd REFP outcomes. Input: Market and objective: (M, f ) Output: Allocation X and a pricing p 1. Run Algorithm 1 on input M to nd allocation X 2. Run Algorithm 2 on input (M, X , f ) to nd prices p Output (X , p) e linear program shown in Algorithm 2 can be used to nd a set of restricted envy-free prices. is program's objective is an arbitrary linear function of an allocation X and prices p, and its constraints are the linear conditions that characterize restricted envy-freeness. eorem 3.6 implies the next corollary for the case of single-minded bidders.
C 3.7. Given an allocation X , the problem of deciding the existence of a WE is solvable in polynomial time, in single-minded CCMMs.
P
. Consider the region formed by Individual Rationality, the Compact Condition, and the following constraints: ∀j ∈ C : If |X j | = 0 then P j (X j ) ≥ V j (X j ). If this region is empty, then there are no prices for which both winners and losers can be envy-free at the same time, and thus, a WE does not exists.
Note that this theorem does not apply to size-interchangeable bidders, because a loser might be interested in an exponential number of bundles, and we would thus need an exponential number of constraints to guarantee that the price of each exceeds the loser's reward.
Finding Restricted Envy-Free Pricings (REFP)
We can now present our algorithm for nding REFPs. Algorithm 3 uses Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 as subroutines to rst nd an approximately welfare-maximizing allocation and then, using this allocation, it solves for a set of supporting restricted envy-free prices.
We have thus succeeded in deriving a polynomial-time algorithm for nding a REFP, assuming a linear objective. In the remainder of this paper, we focus our a ention on revenue maximization in size-interchangeable CCMMs, extending Algorithm 3 to form the heart of a heuristic that searches for revenue-maximizing REFPs. While maximizing seller revenue is one fundamental economic objective, we note that Algorithm 3 is exible enough to allow for di erent objectives, and thus may be applicable in a wider variety of se ings.
REVENUE MAXIMIZING EQUILIBRIA
We start by de ning what revenue-maximization means for di erent solution concepts, and we review algorithms found in the literature to compute these solutions in the special case of unitdemand bidders. We then present our heuristic for nding revenue-maximizing REFPs in sizeinterchangeable CCMMs.
Problem Definitions
De nition 4.1.
e revenue-maximizing WE problem: Given a CCMM, nd a revenuemaximizing WE. Gul and Stache i [1999] presented the following VCG-inspired [Vickrey, 1961] polynomialtime algorithm that solves the revenue-maximizing WE problem in unit-demand CCMMs. Let V ∈ R n + × R m + be the valuation matrix of a market with n goods and m unit-demand bidders where entry V i j denotes bidder j's valuation for good i. Let π denote a maximum-weight matching of V , and let w (V ) denote the weight of π . Let V −i denote the same valuation matrix, but with good i removed. For each good i, set p i = w (V ) − w (V −i ). We call this algorithm, which returns outcome
Since a WE requires unallocated goods to be priced at 0, and at the same time ensures that all bidders are envy-free, the seller revenue corresponding to a WE may be constrained to be very low. 
Outcome (B)'s allocation is welfare maximizing. To support a WE we must have 0 ≤ p B 2 ≤ 1; otherwise c 2 would not be envy-free. Moreover, p B 1 ≤ p B 2 ; otherwise c 1 would have preferred a copy of u 2 . So prices can only be as high as p B 1 = p B 2 = 1, yielding revenue of 2. Outcome (C)'s allocation is not welfare maximizing. However, in this case, an EFP (and hence, a REFP) can be supported by higher prices than those in (B). In particular, p C 2 ≥ 1; otherwise c 2 would have preferred a copy of u 2 . Again p C 1 ≤ p C 2 for the same reasons as in (B). Prices could be as high as p C 1 = p C 2 = 100, yielding revenue of 100. e previous example motivates the introduction of reserve prices as a way to increase revenue while maintaining envy-freeness among bidders. For example, we could set a reserve price of $2 for u 2 . Doing so would increase revenue from a maximum possible of $2 (with no reserve price) to $100. But the use of reserve prices e ectively throws some bidders out of the market; thus welfare is sacri ced, because any value these bidders could have potentially brought to the market is lost.
Motivated by this observation and building on Myerson's [1981] intuition that reserve prices can boost revenue, Guruswami et al. [2005] generalized the de nition of WE so that unallocated goods are priced at some, possibly non-zero, reserve price r ∈ R + , and de ned the problem of searching among these equilibria for one that maximizes revenue.
De nition 4.3. (Walrasian Equilibrium with reserve r ). A feasible outcome (X , p) is a Walrasian Equilibrium with reserve r (WEr) if it is a WE with prices at least r , including unallocated goods, which must be priced at exactly r .
De nition 4.4.
e revenue-maximizing WEr problem: Given a CCMM, nd a revenuemaximizing WEr.
Note that an EFP is agnostic as to the price of unallocated goods and thus, it is a generalization of a WEr. e general revenue-maximizng EFP problem is de ned as follow.
ALGORITHM 4: Revenue-maximizing heuristic for size-interchangeable CCMMs. Input: Market M and solution concept S Output: A pricing p and an allocation X 1. Find an initial allocation X . 2. For all x i j > 0:
2.1 Set a reserve price r as a function of x i j and M. 2.2 Find (X , p) for concept S using reserve r . Output a pair (X , p) with maximal seller revenue.
De nition 4.5.
e revenue-maximizing EFP problem: Given a CCMM, nd a revenuemaximizing EFP.
Analogously, we de ne a revenue-maximizing REFP.
De nition 4.6.
e revenue-maximizing REFP problem: Given a CCMM, nd a revenuemaximizing REFP.
Schematically, these solutions concepts obey the following containment relationship: WE ⊆ WEr ⊆ EFP ⊆ REFP. us, any algorithm used to nd a revenue-maximizing WEr could be used to nd an EFP, or even a REFP.
Next, we describe a revenue-maximizing strategy for any of these solution concepts, and explain how this strategy was used in the case of unit-demand bidders to nd an approximately revenuemaximizing EFP (by leveraging an algorithm that nds a WEr for a given reserve price).
Computing Revenue-Maximizing REFP
Algorithm 4 is a high-level strategy for searching among di erent equilibria for one that is revenuemaximizing. e algorithm searches over di erent allocations X , computing revenue-maximizing prices p for each, and then outputs a pair (X , p) among those seen with maximal seller revenue. e interesting choice, which governs the algorithm's success, is the subspace of allocations that it searches. In Algorithm 4, this space is determined based on some initial allocation, which in turn determines a set of reserve prices, each of which yields an alternative allocation. Note that this strategy only makes sense for solution concepts that vary with reserve prices. We will discuss instances of this strategy that search for revenue-maximizing WEr (and thus, approximate revenue-maximinzg EFP) in the case of unit-demand bidders, and REFP in the case of single-minded and size-interchangeable bidders.
Unit-demand, revenue-maximizing WEr. In the unit-demand case, Guruswami et al. [Guruswami et al., 2005] , showed that the following instance of Algorithm 4 nds a revenue-maximizing WEr with revenue at least OPT/(2 ln m), where OPT is the revenue of a revenue-maximizing WEr. (Step 1.) Find a maximum weight matching X of V . (Step 2.) For each valuation r on the edges of X , compute a WEr as follows: for each good i augment the valuation matrix to include two dummy bidders, each with reward r . Run MaxWE on the new valuation matrix to obtain a WE (π , p), based on which a new matching π can be inferred by reallocating goods from dummy bidders to real bidders. Calculate the revenue associated with (π , p). We call this Algorithm MaxWErApprox.
Size-Interchangeable, revenue-maximizing REFP. Like the algorithm of Guruswami et al. [2005] , our approach to searching for a revenue-maximizing REFP in size-interchangeable CCMMs follows the structure of Algorithm 4. at is, for various choices of r , corresponding to various allocations X , we nd a REFP where goods are priced at least at r , and then we output a REFP which is revenue-maximizing among all those considered. More speci cally, we rst nd an approximately welfare-maximizing allocation X (Step 1), and then for all x i j > 0, we nd a REFP with reserve r = R j /x i j (Step 2.1).
To nd a REFP with reserve (Step 2.2), we use a generalization of Algorithm 2 that receives a reserve price r as an additional input, and includes the additional set of constraints: ∀i ∈ U : p i ≥ r . However, it could happen that an allocation is input in which a winner cannot a ord its bundle at the given reserve price, rendering Algorithm 2 infeasible. In this case, we say that "the allocation does not respect the reserve price". To overcome this problem, we use the following straightforward generalization of Algorithm 1 to produce an allocation that respects the reserve price, r :
Given input market M, construct new market M by removing any bidder j such that R j − rI j < 0, and se ing the reward of the remaining bidders to be R j − rI j . Now run Algorithm 1 on input M to obtain an allocation X , which we li up to create an allocation, X r , in the original market M that respects reserve prices.
In sum, our precise heuristic uses the aforementioned generalizations of Algorithms 1 and 2 in Steps 1 and 2.2, respectively, to search over REFPs within Algorithm 4.
We have thus succeeded in de ning a heuristic that searches for a revenue-maximizing REFP. In the remainder of this paper, we investigate the quality of this heuristic; rst, theoretically, in the special case of singleton markets; and then, in simulation experiments in more general market se ings.
THEORETICAL RESULTS IN TWO SPECIAL CASES OF CCMMS
Before presenting our experimental results on size-interchangeable CCMMs in general, we de ne singleton CCMMs, a special case of unit-demand CCMMs, and prove that our heuristic (Algorithm 3) nds "true" envy-free prices in this special case; in other words, it nds WEr. In this way, we illustrate that this algorithm works from rst principles, generalizing from a special case of unitdemand to the more complicated cases of single-minded and size-interchangeable CCMMs.
We also present natural heuristic for single-minded CCMMs which falls out of our approach of rst solving for an allocation, and then nding prices, in polynomial time, which support that allocation and are as close to envy-free as possible.
Singleton CCMMs
De nition 5.1. (Singleton CCMM) We call a market a singleton CCMM if it is a CCMM in which each bidder demands exactly one good, i.e., ∀j : I j = 1. T 5.2. Algorithm 2, when optimizing for seller-revenue, produces (unrestricted) envy-free prices p on input (M, X , f , r ), where M is a singleton CCMM and X is a welfare-maximizing allocation that respects reserve price r .
P
. Without loss of generality, we assume there is exactly one copy of each good in the market: if the supply of a type of good i is N i > 1, then we can replace this good by N i identical copies of i.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists bidder j who is not envy-free. en, there exists a bundle
Since X is a matching, we have that either |X j | = 0 or |X j | = 1. Case (i) If |X j | = 1, then then there is exactly one good k such that
, bidder j would have preferred to have been allocated a copy of some good l. From (*), R j > p l . But then p is not optimal. We can construct another feasible solution p , identical to p, except that we set p l = R j for all goods l in the transitive closure of j, provided Individual Rationality is not violated, i.e., that the bidder j allocated any such good l has reward R j > p l . Note that any such good l must have been allocated to another bidder j such that R j ≥ R j ; otherwise, X was not optimal.
If the original solution satis es the Compact Condition, then increasing the price of goods l preserves this condition. A bidder not allocated any l is indi erent to an increased price, since the Compact Condition already guarantees it received a cheaper price. A bidder allocated a good l is in the transitive closure of j, and thus, this bidder either had the price of its assigned good changed to R j , in which case it gets a cheaper good, or its price remains the same. erefore, we have a new feasible solution p with more seller revenue than the optimal, a contradiction.
In both cases, we contradict our assumptions, and thus, there exists no such j. C 5.3. Algorithm 2, when optimizing for seller-revenue and augmented with the market clearance condition, ∀i ∈ U : if j x i j = 0 then p i = r , produces a WEr on input (M, X , f , r ), where M is a singleton CCMM and X is a welfare-maximizing allocation that respects reserve price r .
. We need only show that unallocated bidders do not have envy. Consider an unallocated good i. By the market clearance condition, p i = 0. All bidders j connected to i must have been allocated under X ; otherwise, X was not optimal. Now, let k be the good allocated to bidder j. By the Compact Condition p k ≤ p i . erefore, j is envy-free.
ese results imply that, speci cally for single-valued unit-demand bidders, given a welfaremaximizing allocation (which can be computed in polynomial-time in this case [Kuhn, 1955] ), the Individual Rationality, the Compact Condition, and Market Clearance completely characterize WE.
is amounts to a complete characterization of WE via linear constraints in this special case.
Revenue Maximizing REFPs in Single-Minded CCMMs
e following theorem uncovers a relationship between a revenue-maximizing REFP and a welfaremaximizing allocation in the case of single-minded bidders. is theorem gives rise to an approximation algorithm for revenue-maximizing REFP in this special case.
T 5.4. In the case of single-minded bidders, the problem of nding a revenue-maximizing REFP reduces to the problem of nding a welfare-maximizing allocation.
P
. Consider a single-minded CCMM with welfare-maximizing allocation X . We construct a pricing p as follow: ∀j ∈ W , chose an arbitrary good demanded by j, and set p i = R j . Set all other prices to zero. Note that the outcome (X , p) is a REFP, by construction. We argue by contradiction that this outcome maximizes revenue.
First note that p is maximal for X , since incrementing any price would violate individual rationality for the corresponding bidder. So if there is an allocation with more revenue, it must allocate to at least one bidder j who is not allocated in X . But this implies that X was not welfare-maximizing, a contradiction.
Converesly, suppose that (X , p) is a revenue-maximizing REFP. Since winners must be individually rational, this outcome charges at most R j to any j ∈ W . But any revenue-maximizing outcome must charge each bidder its entire value R j , otherwise we could have increased revenue. us, each winner in outcome (X , p) must pay her entire valuation. Since (X , p) is revenue-maximizing, the set of winners in X must maximize welfare.
We now present Algorithm 5, an algorithm to nd approximate revenue-maximizing REFP outcomes in the case of single-minded bidders. Our algorithm uses approximation Algorithm 1 to nd a nearly welfare-maximizing allocation, and then imposes further constraints that make losers as envy-free as possible. (Winners are already envy-free, because they are single-minded, so by de nition, they wouldn't prefer another bundle.) Since the welfare-and revenue-maximizing problems are equivalent, our algorithm exhibits the same approximation ratio showed by [Lehmann et al., 2002] for single-minded bidders, namely √ m.
ALGORITHM 5: Approximate revenue-maximizing REFP outcomes in single-minded CCMMs. Input: Market M with single-minded bidders Output: Allocation X and a pricing p 1. Run Algorithm 1 on input M to nd allocation X 2. Given X , solve the following linear program
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe experimental results obtained for two di erent forms of CCMMs: the rst is entirely synthetic, while the second relies on actual statistical data on web usage. Algorithms were coded in Java, using CPLEX for the mathematical programs. Experiments were run on a grid of Intel Xeon machines, with 2.8 Clock CPU, and at most 8GB of RAM. Note that all code used to obtain experimental results is available at h ps://github.com/eareyan/envy-free-prices.
Experimental setup
Algorithms. Algorithms' names are abbreviated as follows: MaxWErApprox refers to Guruswami et. al's algorithm (see section 4). SingleMindedApprox refers to Huang's et al. 's approximation algorithm for the single-minded case (see Appendix for details). UnlimitedSupply refers to both Guruswami et. al's algorithm, assuming single-minded bidders and unlimited supply, and to our generalization for size-interchangeable bidders (see Appendix for details). SMLP refers to Algorithm 5, our approximation algorithm for single-minded bidders. LP refers to our revenuemaximizing REFP heuristic (Algorithm 4) for size-interchangeable CCMMs. All LP algorithms are quali ed by the objective of the allocation: LP Optimal Utilitarian and LP Optimal Egalitarian indicates whether a welfare-maximizing (i.e., utilitarian) or an optimal egalitarian allocation is given as input; likewise for, LP Greedy Utilitarian and LP Greedy Egalitarian. In our implementations, the greedy approximation algorithms order goods in descending order of remaining supply. We also experimented with ordering goods in ascending order of remaining supply, but saw no qualitative di erences in the results.
Metrics. Given outcome (X , p), revenue is de ned as ρ = j i x i j p i , and welfare as υ = j R j j , where j = 1 in case bidder j is a winner under X and 0 otherwise. Let OPT υ be the value of a welfare-maximizing allocation. 1 Since we assume bidders are individually rational, seller revenue cannot exceed OPT υ . We thus report metrics of e ciency υ/OPT υ , and seller revenue ρ/OPT υ . We also report metrics based on violations of the (unrestricted) envy-freeness and market clearing conditions. We de ne an envy-free violation (EF) as the ratio between the number of bidders that are not envy-free, and the total number of bidders in the market. We de ne envy-free loss (EF Loss) as the ratio of lost utility to total utility among losers, i.e., j W (R j − P * j )/ j W R j , where P * j is the price of j's cheapest bundle. We de ne a market clearance violation (MC) as the ratio between the number of good types that are completely unallocated, but whose price nevertheless is greater than zero, and the total number of goods in the market. Finally, we de ne market-clearance loss (MC Loss) as the ratio of the total price of MC violating goods to the total price of goods, i.e. i |p i >0∧ j x i j =0 p i / i p i . All metrics are reported over two types of markets:
Random-k-Market(n, m, p, k ) and AdXMarket(m, p).
Random-k-Market(n, m, p, k ). Let S = i N i be the total supply of M, and let D = j I j be the total demand of M. e supply-to-demand ratio S/D, is a measure of how over or under demanded a market is. A market is over demanded if S/D < 1 and under demanded if S/D > 1. A random market drawn from Random-k-Market(n, m, p, k ) over CCMM has n goods and m bidders. e parameter p is the probability that an edge (i, j) is present in E, and thus, the expected number of edges is pnm. In the case of size-interchangeable bidders, both N i and I j are integers between 1 and 10, drawn independently, and uniformly at random, such that the supply-to-demand ratio is k. In the case of single-minded bidders, N i = 1, for all i. In the case of singleton bidders, I j = 1, for all j. Finally, each bidder's reward R j is drawn independently and uniformly at random from the range [1, 10] . We generate Random-k-Market(n, m, p, k ) markets with n, m = 1, . . . , 20, p = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, and k = 0.25, 0.33, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4. For each combination, we report the average values of the metrics over 100 independent trials. e time scale is in milliseconds.
AdXMarket(m, p). In the Trading Agent Competition Ad Exchange game [Schain and Mansour, 2013] (TAC AdX), agents bid on behalf of campaigns, each of which requires a xed number of impressions from targeted users to obtain a reward. A targeted user is an Internet user classi ed as either female or male, of age young or old, with low or high income, and is characterized by device (either mobile or PC). 2 When a user visits a website, it produces one or more impression opportunities. As there are six active websites, there are a total of 6 · 2 4 = 96 di erent types of impression opportunities.
Following the TAC AdX speci cation, we construct a distribution we call AdXMarket(m, p). A random market drawn from this distribution has m bidders and 96 goods. e supply of each good is determined by generating 10,000 targeted users according to a distribution constructed from available statistical data from web information services such as www.alexa.com (see Table 2 in [Schain and Mansour, 2013] ), and then simulating these users visiting a website according to a distribution also constructed from available statistical data (see Table 3 in [Schain and Mansour, 2013] )). A er its rst visit, each targeted user continues visiting websites with probability p, up to a maximum of 6 visits. Each campaign j requires a random number of targeted users I j , and has a corresponding reward R j = I j . We generate AdX Market (m, p) markets with m = 1, . . . , 20 and p = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0. For each combination, we report the average values of the metrics over 100 independent trials. e time scale is in milliseconds. 
Results
We report on experiments with three types of valuations: single-minded, singleton, and sizeinterchangeable CCMMs. ese results are summarized in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 , respectively. In all cases, we draw markets from the Random-k-Market(n, m, p, k ) distribution. Additionally, for size-interchangeable CCMMs, we draw markets from the AdXMarket(m, p) distribution. ese results are summarized in Table 4 . In what follows, we rst make some general remarks, and then we identify some of the highlights of our extensive experiments.
Overview. Our experimental results show that, in general, our algorithms performs well across the di erent markets on the metrics of revenue, e ciency, and time, with very few violations of the EF and MC conditions. Although our heuristic searches only REFPs, we nevertheless obtain outcomes that are close to EFPs, even when we seed our heuristic with a welfare-maximizing allocation, rather than an egalitarian one. In other words, our two step approach of rst xing an allocation, and then making only winners envy-free, seems to be a reasonable way to nd nearly EFP outcomes, in which losers are also envy-free.
Also of interest is the fact that only in size-interchangeable CCMMs do the egalitarian algorithms achieve fewer EF violations than the utilitarian ones. e original intent of the egalitarian objective was to increase the number of winners, so that solving for restricted envy-free prices where only winners are envy-free, would yield fewer EF violations-fewer losers would mean fewer opportunities to violate EF. However, egalitarian allocations end up allocating goods to bidders with low rewards which, together with individual rationality, keeps prices low, which of course yields low revenue, but also yields EF violations of greater magnitude, because those bidders with envy have a lot of envy, given that the goods they were not allocated are necessarily cheap.
Single-minded bidders are interested in exactly one bundle (or any bundle that contains that bundle). A single-minded valuation is an example of an AND valuation, which models complements. In contrast, a singleton bidder is interesting in acquiring one good from one of multiple sources, but is indi erent about the precise source. is is an example of an OR valuation, which models substitutes. A size-interchangeable bidder is a combination of these two where bidders are interested in a bundle of certain size (AND), but are indi erent among various sources (OR). Computationally, ANDs appear easier, since they are more restrictive, so further limit the search space, whereas ORs are more exible, and hence requires us to search through more options.
e color conventions used in the tables are as follow. Best results (excluding Optimal Utilitarian and Optimal Egalitarian) are colored in red, and worst results (excluding Optimal Utilitarian and Optimal Egalitarian) are colored in blue.
e Score column reports a summary score for each algorithm, which is de ned as the sum of the absolute value between the algorithm's performance and the performance of the best algorithm in each dimension (Welfare, Revenue, EF, EF Loss, MC, MC Loss, and Time). e score is normalized to be in the range [0, 1], so that any algorithm with score of 0 is a top performer (marked with a ). According to this metric, these algorithms strike the best balance across all dimensions.
Next, we present and analyze results for each type of market studied in this paper.
Single-Minded Valuations. Figure 1 illustrates results for a xed number of goods (10), as we vary the number of bidders (x-axis), in the case of overdemanded markets with single-minded bidders. ese plots show a comparison between two baseline algorithms, SingleMindedApprox and UnlimitedSupply, and our SMLP heuristics. Recall that in this case, welfare and revenue are the same (see eorem 5.4); thus, we present both results in one plot.
ese results depict a general trend: our utilitarian heuristics (both optimal and greedy) outperform the baselines in terms of welfare/revenue. SingleMindedApprox provably commits no MC violations, but commits the most EF violations. UnlimitedSupply's EF violations are provably bounded, but it commits the most MC violations. Unsurprisingly, the egalitarian heuristics do not obtain nearly the welfare/revenue as well as their utilitarian counterparts in these markets; and, as already noted, their EF violations are more substantial. e EF violations of our utilitarian heuristics are on par with those of UnlimitedSupply, and they commit relatively few MC violations as well. Table 1 presents additional, detailed results for single-minded markets. Algorithm SingleMindedApprox has high welfare and revenue, but very high EF and EF Loss. is outcome is not surprising, as this algorithm was designed to price goods so that winners are EF, but does not simultaneously price them so that losers have as li le envy as possible. is algorithm, by de nition, has no MC or MC Loss, which further contributes to high EF and EF Loss. Algorithm Unlimited Supply has low welfare and revenue, but also low EF and EF Loss. is algorithm does a be er job pricing goods so that losers are closer to satisfying the EF condition. However, by de nition, this algorithm violates the MC condition, since all goods are priced equally irrespective of their allocation. A complete description of both of these algorithms is given in the Appendix.
In contrast, our SMLPs, a er maximizing welfare, do a much be er job at balancing the competing objectives, accruing high welfare/revenue with relatively few violations of any kind. Indeed, LP Greedy Utilitarian is the top performer according to our summary score.
Singleton Markets. Table 2 presents detailed results for singleton markets. In the case of overdemanded markets, MaxWErApprox is the clear winner, as it dominates in all measured dimensions. Interestingly, our LP Greedy Egalitarian is the worst performer under all metrics (except time). As discussed above, the reason why the egalitarian allocation fails to produce good results is that this allocation awards goods to bidders irrespective of their reward and thus, ends up allocating to bidders with low reward, which results in a very restrictive upper bound on prices. is outcome is clearly seen in our results-in particular, in the relatively high EF and EF Loss of the egalitarian objective compared to the others-in both over-and under-demanded markets. Unlike in the case of singleton overdemanded markets, for underdemanded markets there was no clear winner or loser; however, LP Greedy Utilitarian is the top performer using our summary score.
Size-Interchangeable Valuations. Figure 2 illustrates results on Random-k-Market(n, m, p, k ) for a xed number of goods (5), as we vary the number of bidders (x-axis), in the case of underdemanded markets with size-interchangeable bidders. ese plots compare the baseline algorithm UnlimitedSupply to our various LP heuristics. In these markets, irrespective of the allocation algorithm used, our algorithms outperform the baseline in terms of welfare, revenue, and MC violations. In the case of EF, all algorithms perform within 1.5% of each other, but the baseline outperforms one of the greedy heuristics. is performance, however, comes at a cost in all other dimensions. Table 3 . Size-Interchangeable Markets Table 3 presents additional, detailed results for size-interchangeable markets. Our results show a symmetric relationship between under-and over-demanded markets where UnlimitedSupply and our LP Greedy Utilitarian share both the best and worst metrics. Note that UnlimitedSupply has the worst welfare, revenue, MC and MC Loss but achieves the best results in terms of EF and EF Loss, and is faster. In contrast, LP Greedy Utilitarian has the best welfare, revenue, MC and MC Loss but achieves the worst results in terms of EF and EF Loss. at said, measured by our summary score, LP Greedy Utilitarian is the top performer, and UnlimitedSupply is the bo om performer in underdemanded markets, and a very distant third, in overdemanded markets.
Finally, Table 4 presents detailed results for TAC markets. Not suprisingly, these results are similar to the size-interchangeable markets' results, with the primary di erence being that the algorithm with the worst performance in terms of welfare is LP Greedy Egalitarian, rather than UnlimitedSupply. LP Greedy Utilitarian remains the top performer (and improves from the worst to the best algorithm as measured by time). 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A Walrasian equilibrium is a fundamental market outcome where market participants are maximally happy and the market e ciently allocates resources. However, a WE need not exist in general CCMMs, even for relatively straightforward forms of bidders' valuations function (e.g., singleminded bidders). In this paper, we take as our starting point a proposed relaxation of WE known as envy-free pricing, which always exists. We relax this solution concept even further by requiring only that winners are envy-free. We call this concept restricted envy-free pricing, and develop a computational framework to compute REFP outcomes for single-minded and size-interchangeable bidders. In our framework, we rst solve for an allocation, and then for supporting prices that guarantees that winners are envy-free. is two-step approach might fail for EFP, but always exists for REFP. We generalize an existing greedy allocation algorithm to the case of size-interchangeable bidders, and use this algorithm as the rst step in our framework. We next tackle the problem of nding a revenue-maximizing REFP among all possible outcomes. e methods develop in the rst part of the paper form the heart of a general heuristic to nd a revenue-maximizing REFP in size-interchangeable CCMMs, as well as an approximation algorithm speci cally developed for single-minded CCMMs. We prove that our general heuristic which searches only for REFP actually nds WEr in singleton markets-so that all bidders, not just winners, are envy-free-thereby arguing that our relaxation is not only computationally feasible, but further, a natural generalization of WEr.
We evaluate the performance of our algorithms experimentally, on both a synthetic distribution and one obtained from real-world web-usage data. ey perform well on metrics of welfare, revenue, EF, and MC violations, compared to baseline algorithms from the literature. Our algorithms perform best when seeded with an approximately welfare-maximizing allocation, and produce results very close to true EFP despite the fact that in our relaxation we only guarantee that winners (not losers) are envy-free. In fact, our approximately welfare-maximizing algorithm is consistently ranked as the top performer algorithm, as measured by a summary score that balances the performance of algorithms across all evaluated dimensions. is paper introduces a novel relaxation of WE, an algorithm to compute this outcome, and a heuristic to search among these outcomes for one that maximizes revenue. All of this machinery was designed to tackle this problem for markets with size-interchangeable bidders. Further study of these valuations, for example in the mechanism design se ing, where valuations are unknown, remains completely open.
Proof of Theorem 3.6 Given a market (U , C, E, N , I , R) and a feasible allocation X , the following conditions are necessary and su cient conditions for p to be restricted envy-free.
Individual Rationality: ∀j ∈ C :
We will prove directly that Individual Rationality and the Compact Condition are necessary conditions for restricted envy-free prices. To prove su ciency, we will use the following alternative conditions:
We will rst prove that Compact Condition implies Conditions A, B and C. To conclude our proof, we prove that Individual Rationality together with Conditions A, B and C are su cient for restricted envy-free prices.
e Compact Condition means that in all goods where a bidder is allocated not nothing from good i, and not everything from good k, then the price in i is less than or equal to the price in k. Condition A means that if a bidder is allocated some of two goods (but not all and not none), then the prices of those two goods must be the same. Condition B means that if a bidder is allocated all copies of a good, then the price of that good is less than the price of other goods where the bidder is allocated some (or none, by transitivity). Finally, Condition C means that if a bidder is allocated some copies of a good, then the price of that good is less than the price of other goods where the bidder is allocated none.
We now show that these are su cient and necessary conditions for restricted envy-free prices.
Necessity. Let X ∈ F . Suppose p is a restricted envy-free pricing. en, for every j such that |X j | > 0 we have X j ∈ arg max X ∈B ( N |X j | ) {V j (X j ) − P j (X j )}. Individual Rationality follows immediately from the fact that, for any j, 0 ∈ B( N |X j | ). We prove the Compact Condition by contradiction. Let i and j be such that x i j > 0 but suppose there exists k such that x k j < N k and p i > p k . In this case we can construct a feasible bundle
follow: initially Y j = X j and then replace k j = x k j + 1 and i j = x i j − 1. In words, take one less from x i j and replace it with one from x k j . Since x i j > 0 and x k j < N k we have that Y j is a feasible bundle. By construction
Since p i > p k and bundle Y j uses one more from k and one less from i compared to bundle X j , it follows that
We show that the Compact Condition implies Conditions A, B and C and thus, establish that all conditions are necessary for restricted envy-free prices. Suppose the Compact Condition is true. Let us prove each condition separately:
Condition A: Suppose (a) 0 < x i j < N i and (b) 0 < x k j < N k . Apply the compact condition in two ways: (1) by (a), 0 < x i j and by (b), x k j < N k , thus, compact condition implies p i ≤ p k . (2) by (b), 0 < x k j and by (a), x i j < N i , thus, compact condition implies p k ≤ p i . (1) and (2) imply that Su iciency. It su ces to show that Conditions A, B, C and Individual Rationality imply restricted envy-free prices. Given X , suppose for a contradiction that p is a pricing that is not restricted envy-free but that satis es conditions Conditions A, B, C and Individual Rationality.
By de nition there exists j such that |X j | > 0 but
{V j (X j ) − P j (X j )} Let Y j ∈ B( N |X j | ) be such that Y j ∈ arg max X ∈B ( N |X j | ) {V j (X j ) − P j (X j )}. is means:
We must have |Y j | = |X j |, for otherwise |Y j | = 0 would imply V j (Y j ) = P j (Y j ) = 0, but by Individual Rationality |X j | > 0 implies P j (X j ) ≤ V j (X j ), contradicting (*). us, |Y j | = |X j |, which means V j (Y j ) = V j (X j ). Simplifying ( * ) we get:
We will now show that equation ( * * ) leads to a contradiction. First note that, by de nition, P j (Y j ) ≥ 0 together with ( * * ) imply P j (X j ) > 0. is means that there is some good i such that the allocation x i j > 0 and p i > 0. Without loss of generality, let us consider the following cases:
(1) bundle Y j contains goods from at least one di erent good than X j . We know that x i j > 0. Suppose, without loss of generality, that x k j = k j , x i j > i j and l j > x l j = 0. Since both bundles have the same number of goods, it follows that x i j = i j + l j . is implies that x i j p i = ( i j + l j )p i = i j p i + l j p i . By Condition C, 0 < p i ≤ p l , and thus x i j p i ≤ i j p i + l j p l . It follows that bundle Y j is at least as expensive as X j , since P j (X j ) = x i j p i + x k j p k ≤ i j p i + l j p l + k j p k = P j (Y j ). us, P j (X j ) ≤ P j (Y j ), contradicting (**).
(2) bundle Y j contains a di erent number of copies from the same good in X j . Consider ϵ > 0. In this case it must be that x i j < N i since we cannot take from an exhausted good. If x k j < N k , then Condition A implies p i = p k , and thus P j (X j ) = P j (Y j ). If x k j = N k , then Condition B implies p k ≤ p i , and thus P j (X j ) ≤ P j (Y j ).
In either case, bundle Y j is at least as expensive as X j erefore, we conclude that in all cases bundle Y j is at least as expensive as X j , i.e., P j (Y j ) ≥ P j (X j ), contradicting ( * * ).
Note that the Compact Condition is not su cient nor necessary for restricted envy-free in case V j is not a single step function. Consider a market with 2 goods, both o ered in 1 copy, and 1 bidder, demanding one copy from either good. Suppose the bidder values ge ing 1 copy of good 1 in 1000 and ge ing 1 of good 2 in 100. Pricing the rst good in 20 and the second in 10, the bidder would want to get the more expensive one because since it maximize its utility. So, even though the bidder consumed all copies of a good and not all of another good, the exhausted good is still more expensive than the non-exhausted market.
Mixed ILP to find optimal allocations
Given a market (U , C, E, N , I , R), Algorithm 6 is a mixed ILP that can be used to nd an optimal allocation. To show this, we prove claims (i) and (ii). (2) and (5) imply that a solution to the Mixed-ILP is a feasible allocation.
P
. Constraint (1) guarantees that allocation from a given good does not exceed its supply. Constraint (2) guarantees that if i is not connected to j, then allocation from i to j is exactly zero. Constraint (5) guarantees that allocation is given in positive integer values.
Claim (ii): Constraints (3) and (4) imply that a bidder a ains reward R j if and only if it is completely ful lled, and together with constraint (5), imply that if j = 0 then x i j = 0 for all i.
. Note that satisfying constraint (3) implies that j I j ≤ n i=1 x i j and n i=1 x i j ≤ j I j . ese two inequalities, together with constraint (4), imply that if j = 1 then n i=1 x i j = I j , and if j = 0 then n i=1 x i j = 0 since I j > 0. Finally, if n i=1 x i j = 0 then constraint (5) implies that x i j = 0 for all i. is means that j indicates whether j should be ful lled.
Together, Claims (i) and (ii) imply that a solution found by the mixed ILP is a feasible allocation where a bidder j is completely allocated a bundle of size exactly I j only in case it is ful lled, and an empty bundle otherwise. e objective of the mixed ILP implies that the solution maximizes bidders' rewards over all feasible allocations and thus, it is an optimal allocation. To obtain an allocation that respects reserve price r , change the objective of the mixed ILP to m j=1 (R j − rI j ) j , where r ∈ R + is the reserve price parameter. To obtain an egalitarian allocation, change the objective to m j=1 j . Greedy WE approximation, single-minded For the reader convenience, we present Huang's et.al. single-minded WE approximation in our language (Algorithm 7). is algorithm is guaranteed to have at least m/δ envy-free bidders, where δ = max j I j , i.e., a bound on the size of bidder's demand sets. [Huang et al., 2005] Unlimited Supply EFP Approximation, single-minded For the reader convenience, we present Guruswami's et.al. unlimited supply, . In the single-minded case, this algorithm is a log(m) + log(n) approximation, and this guarantee is retained for nding revenue-maximizing envy-free pricing in the case of size-interchangeable bidders with unlimited supply.
We generalize this algorithm to our limited supply model by allocating bidders in the following order: R 1 /I 1 ≥ R 2 /I 2 ≥ . . . ≥ R m /I m , and allocating each bidder in turn, if possible. As in
